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Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and 
Executive Compensation 
Kevin F. Hallock* 
Abstract 
Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 
8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the 
current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves 
as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee 
sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other 
features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions 
in America's largest companies. CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher 
compensation. Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms. After controlling for firm 
and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when firms that 
are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, 
the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. There also is evidence that the return to 
interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s. 
I. Introduction 
Why are Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of major American companies paid 
such large sums for their services? In the last decade, a literature has grown to offer 
competing explanations. Pay-for-productivity theories (Murphy (1985)) suggest 
that CEOs are extraordinarily productive and worth what they are paid. Tourna-
ment models (Lazear and Rosen (1981)) propose that each firm offers an optimal 
prize to the CEO and that lower level managerial workers strive for that prize. 
Neither of these theories directly considers the role of the board of directors—the 
body that formally sets executive salaries. In this paper, I propose a test for the 
explicit role of the boards of directors in determining CEO salaries. CEOs and 
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their subordinates often are directors of other boards, and CEOs often have much 
discretion in choosing new board members. If two CEOs, or their subordinates, 
serve on each other's boards (they are reciprocally interlocked), then these CEOs 
may have both the incentive and the opportunity to raise each other's pay. 
I use data on the full names, occupations, and employers of nearly 10,000 
directors from more than 700 of America's major corporations to construct two 
measures of interlock of the boards, CEOs, and directors. I then use CEO com-
pensation data from 1992 and other CEO-specific and firm-specific data to study 
the effect of interlock on CEO pay. 
I find that 20% of firms are any-employee interlocked, that is any current or 
retired employee (including the CEO) from firm A sits on firm B's board and any 
current or retired employee (including the CEO) from firm B sits on firm A's board. 
Eight percent of firms are current-CEO interlocked—the current CEO of firm A 
serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of 
firm A. Salaries of CEOs in interlocked firms are higher than in other firms. After 
controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, this pay gap is reduced dramatically. 
However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships 
are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. 
There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in 
the early 1990s. 
II. Summary Statistics and Estimation 
The sample of firms is from the Forbes magazine 500s list, so called because it 
is a list of the 500 largest American companies in each of four different categories: 
sales, profits, assets, and market value. The combined sets in 1992 yield 773 
companies. 
A. Summary Statistics and Data 
I collected data from 1992 on the board of directors from the individual annual 
reports and proxy reports of each of the firms in the sample. For each director, the 
data include seven variables: the name of the firm for which he serves as director, 
his first, middle, and last name, his occupation, his principal employer, and whether 
he is retired. The data cover 9,804 director seats held by 7,519 individuals. There 
are fewer individuals than seats since some directors serve on more than one board. 
When there was missing information, I supplemented the data from annual 
reports and proxy statements with data from The Million Dollar Directory, Stan-
dard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, The Directory 
of Corporate Affiliations, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, the Lexis-Nexis 
System, and Laser Disclosure. It was vital to collect information on all firms 
since the exclusion of one firm, which might be interlocked with others, could 
incorrectly label the remaining firms as not interlocked. 
The data on the 1992 CEO salaries and personal information were collected 
from Forbes magazine's Annual Survey of CEO Compensation from 1993. These 
data cover many of the largest corporations in the U.S. and include the CEO's 
age, years with the firm, and years as CEO. Included are bonuses and other 
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compensation such as insurance policies, restricted shares that vested during the 
year, savings plan contributions, and club memberships. Forbes also reports stock 
gains, which are the value realized by the exercise of options. I primarily use 
three measures of compensation: salary plus bonus, salary plus bonus plus other 
compensation, and total compensation. Total compensation is the sum of salary, 
bonuses, other compensation, and exercised options. Because total compensation 
includes exercised options, it may not reflect current compensation as accurately 
as the other measures.1 
Table 1 describes some of the characteristics of the boards of directors, the 
CEOs, and the firms. The sample size is 602 because data on compensation and 
other CEO and firm characteristics are not available for all of the original firms. The 
summary statistics are broken down into five groups: all firms, non-any-employee 
interlocked firms, any-employee interlocked firms, non-current-CEO interlocked 
firms, and current-CEO interlocked firms. The average number of directors per 
firm is 12.71. Forty-four percent of the directors are principally employed by one 
of the original firms in the sample. 
Table 1 also includes other characteristics of the firm such as market value 
of equity from COMPUSTAT and annual stock return from CRSP. Interlocked 
and non-interlocked firms are statistically significantly different on a number of 
dimensions. CEOs from interlocked firms have higher pay, more directors on their 
boards, and longer tenure with their firms. Interlocked firms have market value 
of equity more than twice that of non-interlocked firms. However, the previous 
year's mean cumulative stock returns for interlocked and non-interlocked firms are 
not significantly different. 
B. Estimation 
Even though CEOs may not necessarily sit on each other's compensation 
committees, the potential for conflicts of interest is likely to be more severe for 
firms that are current-CEO interlocked rather than any-employee interlocked. This 
is because each CEO in the pair actually interacts with other board members at 
board meetings roughly once each month. A positive link between any-employee 
interlock and CEO pay is still plausible, however, for several reasons. The pay 
of non-CEO managers is linked to that of the CEO. They may also strive to 
become the CEO. Additionally, non-CEO-interlocked employees from two firms 
who sit on each other's board can report information to the CEOs about the board 
proceedings. By providing a conduit for information, non-CEO employees can 
convey information to the CEOs that allows them to manipulate the compensation 
process or modify their own behaviors to elicit higher pay. The fact that non-CEOs 
can provide information to the CEOs might also encourage other board members 
to support higher CEO pay. 
Tabic 2 presents compensation regressions for the three different compensa-
tion variables, measured in natural logs: ln(salary + bonus), ln(salary + bonus + 
'For approximately half of the firms, 1 also analyzed, but do not report in the tables, the value of 
stock options granted to the CEO using data from William Mercer Inc. I added this measure of pay to 
salary, bonus, and other. The returns to interlock reported in this paper are similar whether including 
or excluding these option grants. 
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CEO's Age (years) 
CEO's Firm Seniority (years) 
CEO's Seniority as CEO (years) 
CEO's Salary + Bonus (Smillions) 
CEO's Salary + Bonus + Other 
(Smillions) 
CEO's Total Compensation (Smillions) 
Market Value of Equity (Smillions) 
Stock Return3 in Year t - 1 
Number of Directors on Board 
Proportion of Directors Employed by 
One of Original Sample Firms 
N 
(1) 
All 
56.98 
(0.27) 
23.72 
(0.49) 
8.52 
(0.31) 
1.10 
(0.04) 
1.35 
(0.05) 
2.57 
(0.23) 
4843 
(336) 
0.48 
(0.03) 
12.71 
(0.16) 
0.44 
(0.01) 
602 
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
(2) 
Non-
Any-Employee 
Interlocked 
56.75b 
(0.32) 
22.62b 
(0.56) 
8.87b 
(0,36) 
1.05b 
(0.05) 
1,28b 
(0.06) 
2.45 
(023) 
3783b 
(324) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
12.32b 
(0.19) 
0.41b 
(0.01) 
479 
(3) 
Any-Employee 
Interlocked 
57.88b 
(0.43) 
28.02b 
(0.87) 
7.17b 
(0.28) 
1.27b 
(006) 
1.64b 
(0.06) 
3.05 
(0.63) 
8973b 
(975) 
0.44 
(0.04) 
14.24b 
(0.29) 
0.54b 
(0.01) 
123 
(4) 
Non-
Current-CEO 
Interlocked 
56.82c 
(0.29) 
23.27° 
(0.51) 
8.35d 
(0.32) 
1.07c 
(0.04) 
1.32c 
(0.05) 
2.45 
(0.21) 
4498c 
(340) 
0.48 
(0.03) 
12.55c 
(0.17) 
0.43° 
(0.01) 
557 
(5) 
Current-CEO 
Interlocked 
58.93c 
(0.71) 
29.31c 
(1.38) 
1O.60d 
(101) 
1.42c 
(0.21) 
1.71c 
(0.13) 
4.02 
(1.47) 
9121c 
(1466) 
0.51 
(0.08) 
14.73c 
(0.53) 
0.54° 
(0.08) 
45 
Summary statistics are presented for all. for non any-employee interlocked firms, any-employee interlocked firms, non 
current-CEO inlerlocked firms, and for current-CEO interlocked firms in the five columns, respectively. Two firms are 
any-employee interlocked if any current or retired employee (including CEOs) of firm A serves as a director of firm B and 
if any current or retired employee (including CEOs) of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Two firms are current-CEO 
interlocked if the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and vice versa. Data on CEO pay and characteristics 
are collected from Forbes, accounting data are from COMPUSTAT, and return data are from CRSP. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
a
 Annua! stock return computed from CRSP. Stock return data from 1991. All other data from 1992. 
b
 Indicates that the mean value for this variable is statistically different for non-any-employee interlocked firms relative to 
any-employee interlocked firms at the 1% level of significance. 
c
 Indicates that the mean value for this variable is statistically different for non-current-CEO interlocked firms relative to 
current-CEO interlocked firms at the 1% level of significance. 
d
 Indicates that the mean value for this variable is statistically different for non-current-CEO interlocked firms relative to 
current-CEO interlocked firms at the 5% level of significance. 
other compensation), and ln(total compensation). The table is arranged into two 
panels: Panel A shows the effects of any-employee interlock on CEO pay and Panel 
B shows current-CEO interlock. Without controlling for other firm and individual 
characteristics, the coefficients in Table 2, Panel A, row 1, columns 1 (0.291), 4 
(0.357), and 7 (0.314), imply that compensation of CEOs in any-employee inter-
locked firms is estimated to be 34 to 43% higher than in other firms. These pay 
gaps are estimated using the standard conversion es — 1, where the /3s come from 
the coefficients on interlock from the regressions in Table 2. Using the same sim-
ple conversion, the regressions from columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 2, Panel B imply 
that CEO compensation in current-CEO interlocked firms is estimated to be 46 to 
52% higher than in other firms. All of these differences are statistically significant 
at the 1 % level. There is a substantial difference in CEO pay for interlocked CEOs 
relative to non-interlocked CEOs, no matter how interlock or pay are measured. 
Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table 2, Panel A include as additional regressors the 
age of the CEO and its square, the CEO's seniority in the firm and its square, the 
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CEO's seniority as CEO and its square, ln(firm market value), the lagged annual 
stock market return, and the number of directors on the board. The regressions 
also include 20 industry indicator variables collected from Forbes, which are not 
reported in the table. Compensation increases at a declining rate with the CEO's 
age and seniority. The coefficient on lagged stock return is positive, but statistically 
significant only for the total compensation measure.2 
The effect of market value of equity is highly statistically significant. The 
functional form for this variable in a compensation regression is important not only 
for its own sake, but also for the effect it has on the other covariates. For example, 
if I use the actual level (instead of the natural log) of the firm's market value as a 
control, the coefficient on any-employee interlock in Table 2, Panel A, column 2, 
row 1 is 0.179 with a r-statistic of 3.0 rather than 0.092 with a f-statistic of 1.58. 
As reported in Table 1, larger firms are more likely to interlock than smaller firms. 
Market value and interlock are so highly correlated that specifying market value as 
linear seriously affects the coefficient on interlock. The Appendix and Appendix 
Figure 1 describe in more detail why it is more appropriate to specify ln(market 
value of equity) than levels as a covariate. The ln(market value) specification is also 
consistent with the literature (see, for example, Murphy (1985)). Alternative ways 
to control for firm size, such as that described in the Appendix, yield estimates of 
the return to interlock almost identical to those reported in Table 2. The coefficient 
on the any-employee interlock variable falls to 0.092 (Table 2, Panel A, column 
2) and becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels when the control 
variables are included in the regression. 
Column 5 of Table 2, Panel A repeats the analysis of column 2 while using 
ln(salary + bonus + other compensation) as the dependent variable. The results 
are similar to those presented in column 2, except that the return to any-employee 
interlock is higher (0.142) and significant at the 5% level. Since any-employee 
interlock produces a larger effect on this dependent variable, I investigated other 
compensation more closely. Ninety-three percent of the firms in the sample offer 
their CEOs at least some other compensation. Other compensation is, on average, 
13.5% of salary plus bonus plus other. If I use the 93% of firms with non-zero other 
compensation and run a least squares regression of ln(other compensation) on the 
complete list of control variables from Table 2, the return to interlock is much higher 
than reported in the table. The coefficient on any-employee interlock implies a 
difference of 57.1% with a r-statistic of 3.0. The coefficient on current-CEO 
interlock implies a relatively smaller difference of 25.9%, however. If, instead, I 
use the entire set of data, including observations with zero other compensation, 
tobit specifications censoring either at 1 or at the minimum of other non-zero 
compensation yield even larger effects. Even though other compensation is a 
relatively small part of remuneration, interlocking has a significant effect on it. 
Because it is less tangible than salary, individual directors may be able to influence 
other compensation more easily than salary. 
Column 8 of Table 2 uses ln(total compensation) as the dependent variable 
and includes the same set of control variables as reported in columns 2 and 5. 
2Although there are some significant outliers in CEO pay, results are similar if I use median 
regressions (Koenker and Bassett (1978)) rather than OLS. The OLS estimates are reported in this 
paper. 
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The coefficient on the interlock variable is smaller than those reported in columns 
2 and 5 and insignificant. I have reported the results for total compensation for 
completeness even though, as I mentioned earlier, this dependent variable includes 
the value of exercised options and not the value of options when granted. This 
variable potentially has a lot of noise associated with it as the exercise of options 
can be quite irregular over time. 
Interlocks may simply reflect legitimate business relationships such as cus-
tomer/supplier, banking, or other business relationships, and not the cronyism 
implied by Rees (1992). For each interlocked firm, I examined annual reports, 
proxy statements, lOKs, and lOQs to determine why these firms were interlocked 
with one another. For each firm, I searched by computer through the reports for 
the name of the firm to which it was interlocked. When I found the name of an 
interlocked firm, I made a determination as to why the interlocks took place. For 
example, firms can be interlocked because one firm supplies goods or services to 
the other or because they participate in a joint venture with one another. A number 
of firms seem to be interlocked because of documented business relationships. For 
example, 26% of any-employee interlocked firms and 36% of current-CEO inter-
locked firms had identifiable business relationships. Although a large fraction of 
interlocks remains unexplained by these relationships, it is plausible that cronyism 
is less of a problem in firms with such formal business arrangements. 
In columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table 2, Panel A, those interlocked firms that have 
documented business relationships are redefined as not interlocked and the analysis 
of columns 2, 5, and 8 is repeated. For the first two measures of compensation, 
when controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the point estimates for the return 
to interlock are higher when firms with business relationships are considered to 
be not interlocked (compare column 3 to column 2 and column 6 to column 5). 
Redefining interlock leaves only those firms with potentially the largest opportunity 
for agency problems. 
Panel B of Table 2 repeats the analysis of Panel A but focuses on current-CEO 
interlocks. Without conditioning on other covariates, firms that are current-CEO 
interlocked pay their CEOs substantially higher pay. In columns 2, 5, and 8, when 
covariates are introduced, the point estimates on interlock fall and are insignificant. 
However, when interlocks that can be explained by business relationships are 
considered not interlocked, in columns 3, 6, and 9, the return to interlock rises 
substantially for the first two measures of pay. Given the earlier discussion of the 
differences in the two types of interlock, it is plausible to expect a higher return for 
current-CEO interlock relative to any-employee interlock. In fact, however, it is 
not higher. But when interlocks explained by business relationships are redefined 
as not interlocked, the current-CEO interlock coefficients are larger compared with 
the any-employee interlock coefficients than discussed earlier, at least for the first 
two measures of pay. 
I have repeated the analyses reported earlier using compensation data for the 
years before and after the focus of this study, 1991 and 1993. Results using the 
compensation data from 1991 and 1993 are qualitatively similar to those reported 
above for 1992. 
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III. Return to Interlock over Time 
To study the effects of interlock over time, I obtained a data set from Bearden 
and Mintz (1985) who studied the largest 252 firms in terms of sales in 1976. 
Their data are quite similar to mine in that they also study very large firms. I was 
able to construct any-employee interlock measures for 1976 using their data. The 
fraction of any-employee interlocked firms in the sample constructed from their 
data is 7.54%. Following their selection procedure and using my 1992 data yields 
an any-employee interlock fraction of 28.57%. Note that this is higher than the 
20% reported earlier for the 1992 data—as the very largest firms are more likely to 
interlock. For the comparison described in this section, the sample construction of 
the data sets is identical, although the fraction interlocked in 1992 is much higher. 
Table 3 presents a comparison of the returns to interlock in 1976 with those 
in 1992 and shows that the return to interlock is higher in 1976. Panel A of 
Table 3 presents results for the dependent variable ln(salary + bonus) and Panel 
B for ln(total compensation). The middle compensation category from Table 
2, which includes other compensation, is not included in Table 3 since data on 
other compensation are not available for 1976. Column 1 presents regression 
results using the full sample from 1992 and column 2 presents results for the 1992 
subsample, which only includes the largest 252 firms in terms of sales. There is 
not a significantly different return to interlock using the entire 1992 data set rather 
than the smaller subset of firms. Column 3 uses the same sample selection criteria 
as column 2 but uses data from 1976 instead of 1992. In column 3, the return to 
any-employee interlock is very high and statistically significant, 21.3 and 16.6%, 
respectively, for the dependent variables. 
TABLE 3 
Return to Any-Employee Interlock Using Data from Two Periods, 1992 and 1976 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: ln(salary + bonus) 
ANY-EMPLOYEE Interlock 
fl* 
Panel B. Dependent Variable: ln(total compensation) 
ANY-EMPLOYEE Interlock 
R? 
N 
Full Sample 1992 
0.092 
(1.583) 
0.306 
0.060 
(0.665) 
0.275 
602 
Largest Firms by 
Sales 1992 
0.115 
(1.603) 
0.225 
0.139 
(1.240) 
0.210 
213 
Largest Firms by 
Sales 1976 
0.213*** 
(2.696) 
0.295 
0.166** 
(1.983) 
0.340 
232 
The dependent variables in Panels A, and B, respectively, are ln(salary +bonus) and ln(total compensation). Total 
compensation = salary + bonus + other compensation (which includes such items as insurance policies, restricted 
shares that vested during the year, savings plan contributions, and memberships to clubs) + exercised options. The 
data in columns 1 and 2 are for 1992 and the data in column 3 are from 1976. The data used to construct the interlock 
variables used in column 3 are from Bearden and Mintz (1985). All specifications also control for 20 industry indicator 
variables, age of the CEO and its square, seniority of the CEO in the firm and its square, seniority of the CEO as CEO 
and its square, ln(firm value), and the number of directors on the board. The largest 252 firms in 1992 (column 2) and 
the largest 252 firms in 1976 (column 3) were used to construct the any-employee interlock variables. Sample sizes 
differ from 252 as not all other information is available for all firms. 
"significant at 0.01, and **" significant at 0.05. (/--statistics are in parentheses). 
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It is particularly interesting that the return to interlock is higher in 1976 than 
1992, especially given that the fraction of interlocked firms is much higher in 1992 
than in 1976. In light of a comment by Jensen and Murphy (1990) that "disclosure 
of top-management compensation can guard against 'looting' by management (in 
collusion with 'captive' boards of directors)," it is surprising that the true fraction 
interlocked is smaller in the later period since disclosure has become more common 
and SEC rules more strict. The data suggest that although firms are more likely 
to have interlocking relationships, these are not being translated into substantially 
higher pay for CEOs. 
IV. Agency 
To study whether the fraction of employees interlocked is larger than would be 
expected by chance, I ran simulations to examine what fraction of firms would be 
interlocked if directors were randomly assigned to board positions. We should not 
think a priori that this fraction is zero. To test whether the portion of firms that are 
any-employee interlocked is simply an artifact of random assignment, I simulated 
what the true fraction interlocked would be under a set of simple assumptions. 
First, I assumed that the directors who are currently in my sample are the entire 
population of potential directors. Second, I assumed that for each of 999 iterations 
of randomly assigning directors, each director had a probability of 1 of being 
reassigned a spot in the pool. Finally, I assumed that interlocks are allowed within 
an industry.3 I effectively sorted each of the 9,804 director positions and randomly 
put directors back into positions. I did this 999 times and each time computed the 
fraction interlocked. Although each of the assumptions tends to overestimate the 
simulated fraction interlocked, actual board directors interlock much more often 
than would occur by random chance: the actual number interlocked is five times 
the simulated level. 
There is some reason to believe that interlock is due to agency conflicts. First, 
simulation estimates suggest that interlocking happens far more often than can be 
explained by random chance. Second, although up to one-third of interlocks can 
be explained by business relationships, a large fraction of interlocking cannot be 
explained in this way. Finally, the return to interlock is higher when firms with 
documented business relationships are considered not interlocked. Taken together, 
these facts suggest that interlock could be due to agency problems. 
V. Econometric Issues 
A. Sample Selection 
Because of the way I constructed the sample, some firms that may actually 
be interlocked may artificially look not interlocked. If directors tend to associate 
with directors of firms like their own in terms of firm value, then firms near the 
bottom of the sample may be interlocked with firms just below them (who are out 
of the sample). Also, firms high in value have fewer directors to choose from if 
3
 According to the Clayton Act of 1914, employees of one firm cannot serve as directors of another 
firm in the same industry. 
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they want directors from like firms. To study this possibility, I split the sample in 
half in terms of the market value of equity of the firms. If the sample construction 
is a problem, then there should be a larger effect of interlock on CEO pay for firms 
with high equity value than for firms with low equity value.4 Firms in the upper 
half of the value distribution are any-employee interlocked 33% of the time, and 
those in the lower half of the value distribution are any-employee interlocked only 
8% of the time. However, selection is not systematically driving the results, since 
the coefficient on interlocked is higher and more significant in high value firms if 
the dependent variable is a function of salary plus bonus, but lower if the dependent 
variable is a function of either salary plus bonus plus other compensation or total 
compensation. 
B. Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The interpretation of the models in Tables 2 and 3 depends on the assumption 
that CEOs in companies with different levels of interlock are otherwise identical, 
conditional on the observed control variables. However, there is some reason to 
suspect this is not the case. Since there are large differences in the observable 
characteristics of CEOs of interlocked and non-interlocked firms, it is likely that 
there are additional explanations for CEO pay beyond those already stated, in-
cluding interlock. If interlock is just a proxy for other, unobserved variables, then 
controlling for other variables as well may at least partially reduce the effect of 
interlock. 
I have considered several possibilities for additional controls. One is the 
fraction of the board of directors that is principally employed by one of the firms 
in the sample. Forty-four percent of the directors are employed by one of the large 
firms. The coefficient on this variable in a compensation regression could have a 
few interpretations. First, it could be interpreted as a measure of cronyism. Second, 
it could be interpreted as a measure of firm quality. If a higher fraction of the board 
members from large firms implies a more prestigious firm, this could translate into 
higher CEO pay. Also, Morck, Schliefer, and Vishny (1989) have suggested 
that Tobin's Q may proxy for the ability of the managers. Additionally Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis (1993) and Rosen (1982) have argued that firms with above 
average wages may have workers of above average ability, so I have controlled for a 
crude measure of the average firm wage by using the total labor and related expenses 
of the firm divided by the total employees (collected from COMPUSTAT). Finally, 
I controlled for the occupational distribution of the board members by including 
12 indicator variables for board member occupations: CEO, chairman, president, 
vice-chairman, vice-president, professor, attorney, doctor, government official, 
consultant, businessman, and other. If boards organized in particular ways are 
more likely to be interlocked and more likely to have higher paid CEOs, then 
interlock could be a proxy for good management and not cronyism. Collectively 
controlling for these measures reduces the return to interlock slightly. Although the 
4Another way to see if directors tend to come from similar firms in terms of firm market value of 
equity is to measure the correlation between firm value and average value of the firms that principally 
employ the directors. This is difficult, however, as many directors are employed by organizations 
outside of the sample of firms, such as universities and foundations. 
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data do not allow for more sophisticated tests for unobserved heterogeneity, these 
results using additional controls suggest that additional covariates might further 
reduce the measured return to interlock. 
VI. Concluding Comments 
Previous study of the compensation of CEOs has excluded detailed analysis 
of the group that actually sets CEO pay, the board of directors. This work uses 
data on the composition of the boards of directors of America's largest firms as 
well as information on CEO compensation and firm characteristics to test the hy-
pothesis that CEOs who are reciprocally interlocked with other CEOs via their 
boards of directors can raise their wages above those of their counterparts who are 
not interlocked. There is a substantial amount of interlock. About 20% of firms 
are any-employee interlocked. Roughly 8% of firms are current-CEO interlocked. 
Interlocked CEOs earn, on average, significantly higher pay than non-interlocked 
CEOs. After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, this pay gap is reduced 
dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented busi-
ness relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock 
is as high as 17%. There is also evidence that the return to interlock was higher in 
the 1970s than in the early 1990s. 
Appendix. Discussion of ln(Firm Market Value of Equity) 
Functional Form Assumption in the In(Compensation) 
Regression 
Table 1 demonstrates that interlocked firms are, on average, twice as large as 
non-interlocked firms. In the regressions of CEO pay on firm characteristics, the 
specification of functional form of the market value of the firm is crucial to the 
coefficient on interlock. 
To test what specification for firm size was appropriate, I ran a series of 
regressions like the following, 
In(salary + bonus) = a + /3, (CEO's Age) + /32(CEO's Age)2 
+ /?3(CEO's firm seniority) + /34(CEO's firm seniority)2 
+ /35(CEO's seniority as CEO) + /36(CEO's seniority as CEO)2 
+ /37(stock return),-] + /38(number of directors on board) 
20 20 
+ \ J Industry,/} + YJ [(value size group);] 6j + e. 
i=2 j=2 
This regression is simply ln(salary + bonus) on many standard CEO and firm-
level characteristics as well as 19 other variables that are indicators for firm market 
value of equity. Since there is a constant, one of the group of 20 is omitted from the 
regression. To construct these firm market value of equity size groups, I sorted the 
data by market value and assigned the smallest 5% to (value size group)] and so on 
up to the largest 5% in (value size group)2o- The coefficients of interest are the 19 
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8j coefficients. Appendix Figure 1 plots these 19 coefficients on the vertical axis 
and ln(average of each of the 19 firm value size groups) on the horizontal axis. The 
straight line in the figure suggests that a log-linear specification is appropriate— 
that is, the regressions should include ln(firm market value of equity) and not 
the level. The results of this analysis are robust to changes in the covariates and 
dependent variables in the equation above. 
APPENDIX FIGURE 1 
Coefficients on Value Indicator Variables 
Points in the figure are the 19 Q, estimates from the following regression: 
ln(salary + bonus) = a + 0-\ (CEO's age) + /?2(CEO's age)2 
+ ^(CEO's firm seniority) + /34(CEO's firm seniority)2 
+ /35(CEO's seniority as CEO) + /36(CEO's seniority as CEO)2 
+ ^(stock return)[_i + ^(number of directors on board) 
20 20 
+ \ Industry,/) + \ [(value size group),] d: + e. 
i=2 y=2 
To construct the market value of equity size groups, I sorted the data by firm market value 
of equity and assigned the smallest 5% to (value size group)! and so on up to (value size 
group)2o- Since there is a constant, one of the group of 20 is omitted from the regression. 
The other variables are described in the text and other tables. 
a 1 . 5 -
o 1.3 
0 3 
0 7 
E 0.5 
" 0.3 
7 8 9 10 
ln(market value of equity size groups in millions) 
11 
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